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Abstract
We experience the world as a seamless stream of percepts. However, intriguing illusions
and recent experiments suggest that the world is not continuously translated into conscious
perception. Instead, perception seems to operate in a discrete manner, just like movies
appear continuous although they consist of discrete images. To explain how the temporal
resolution of human vision can be fast compared to sluggish conscious perception, we pro-
pose a novel conceptual framework in which features of objects, such as their color, are
quasi-continuously and unconsciously analyzed with high temporal resolution. Like other
features, temporal features, such as duration, are coded as quantitative labels. When
unconscious processing is “completed,” all features are simultaneously rendered conscious
at discrete moments in time, sometimes even hundreds of milliseconds after stimuli were
presented.
Introduction
A diver is jumping from a cliff. We see his trajectory against the blue sky at each single moment
in time. Consciousness seems to be a continuous stream of ever smoothly changing percepts,
and thus it is intuitively appealing to assume that sensory information is continuously trans-
lated into conscious perception. However, already in the third century B.C., the Abhidharma
Buddhist school proposed that perception is actually a series of discrete consciousness
moments [1]. In Western science, Karl Ernst von Baer coined the term “moment” as the border
between the past and the future in the 19th century and, thus, introduced the controversial dis-
crete theories of perception [2]. Discrete theories postulate that conscious perception is a series
of distinct moments, similar to snapshots recorded by a video camera [3–8].
Continuous and discrete theories are two opposing poles, and various accounts of interme-
diate stance have been proposed (for an overview see [9]). All these accounts aim to explain
how we can be directly aware of temporally extended events like movement and change, even
though our conscious experience is confined to the moment [10]. After all, we are aware of the
redness of a red patch as directly as we are of the motion of a moving object, even though color
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is a “static” visual feature whereas motion requires integration over time [11]. Some philoso-
phers have argued that we can perceive motion and change because our episodes of conscious
experience are not momentary, but they extend over time [12,13]. Others avoid this issue by
denying the sheer existence of phenomenal consciousness [14,15]. Today, this debate is still
unresolved and puzzles philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and neuroscientists alike
[3,9,16,17]. Here, we will first review experimental evidence that challenges our intuitive
assumption that the world is processed as a seamless stream of ongoing perception. Based on
these findings, we will then propose a brain-based framework that describes how time-con-
suming unconscious processes can give rise to perceptual moments that contain nonstatic tem-
poral information.
Experimental evidence supporting the view that perception might be discrete comes from
psychophysical experiments showing that when two stimuli are presented in rapid succession,
they are perceived simultaneously, as if they are occurring within a single perceptual episode,
i.e., within one snapshot [18–20]. However, the inability to make simultaneity versus nonsi-
multaneity judgments has also been explained in terms of stimulus persistence at the early lev-
els of the visual system, an interpretation consistent with online continuous perception [21].
Further supporting evidence for discrete theories includes the real-life wagon wheel illusion,
where turning wheels can appear to be rotating backwards, as it is argued, due to discrete sam-
pling [7,22]. Conversely, the wagon wheel illusion can also be interpreted by perceptual rivalry
without referring to discrete snapshots [23]. Another conversely discussed phenomena is the
so-called flash lag illusion: when a moving object and a flash are presented at the same location,
the flash is perceived as lagging behind [24]. One possible explanation suggests that the flash
resets motion integration, and that motion is newly calculated and postdicted to the time of the
flash [17]. According to this view (which is disputed [25]), visual awareness is postdictive and
thus seemingly incompatible with continuous theories.
One of the most striking examples against continuous theories is the color phi phenomenon
[26]. When two colored disks are presented spatially displaced in rapid succession, it appears
as if one disk moves between the two positions and changes color in the middle of its trajectory
(Fig 1). Logically it is impossible to experience the color change before having seen the second
disk. The conscious percept must have been formed retrospectively, thus contradicting contin-
uous theories. As an extreme example, under certain conditions, a stimulus that had been pre-
sented first can even be perceived occurring after a stimulus presented later in time [27].
Clearly, such temporal reversals are incompatible with continuous visual perception.
A more recent study, combining feature fusion and transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS), showed for the first time that unconscious processing, that precedes the formation of a
conscious event, can be quite long lasting. In feature fusion, visual stimuli are presented in
rapid succession at the same location rather than at different ones as in the color phi illusion.
Because of the short durations, the two stimuli are not perceived individually, but as one fused
percept. For example, when a red disk is immediately followed by a green disk, the two disks
fuse and are consciously perceived as only one yellow disc. Feature fusion also occurs in acous-
tics [28], in somato-sensation [28], and with other visual stimuli such as verniers (Fig 2). As
with the colored disks, observers cannot tell the two verniers apart. Only the result of their
unconscious integration is consciously perceived. Still, TMS can modulate the unconscious
integration for up to 400 ms [29]. Hence, under the conditions of this experiment, integration
cannot be completed beforehand and consciousness cannot occur before 400 ms. Interestingly,
the actual presentation of the two verniers took only 60 ms altogether, i.e., unconscious integra-
tion outlasted their presentation by a factor of ~7.
Examples against continuous theories are not limited to vision. The cutaneous rabbit effect
is a somatosensory illusion that arises after rapid and successive stimulation of first the wrist,
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and then of near the elbow [30]. This stimulation creates the illusion of touch along the length
of the arm (as though a rabbit hopped along it), even though it is impossible to experience the
movement trajectory before having been stimulated near the elbow. Also, comprehension in
speech perception is not continuous but can be delayed. For example, in the sentences “the
mouse was broken” and “the mouse was dead,” the last word determines the meaning of the
noun (i.e., either the computer mouse or the animal). Nevertheless, we do not consciously ret-
roactively edit our interpretation of the word “mouse,” but consciousness is delayed until the
meaning of the sentence has been established [31].
All these findings argue clearly against continuous theories of perception. However, they
argue also against simple snapshot theories, in which the brain collects visual information only
at certain discrete points in time, like a camera. For example, we can perceive apparent motion
with differences between visual stimuli of only 3 ms [32], but snapshot models, which sample,
say, every 40 ms, would simply miss the second stimulus. Likewise, with a high sampling rate
we cannot explain why two disks displayed with ~40 ms delay are perceived as occurring within
Fig 1. The color phi phenomenon. If two differently colored disks are shown at different locations in rapid succession, observers experience just one disk
moving from the first to the second location, changing color abruptly midway on the illusory path. How can the observer know in advance what color the
second disk will be and where it will appear? The conscious percept cannot have been formed in a time-ordered fashion, but must have been constructed
retrospectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002433.g001
Fig 2. Long-lasting visual feature integration. Feature fusion: A vernier, which is a pair of vertical bars that are spatially offset either to the left or right, is
presented in rapid succession with a vernier of opposite offset direction. Interestingly, the two verniers are not perceived individually, one after the other, but
as one fused vernier. The perceived spatial offset of the fused vernier is a combination of the offsets of both verniers, i.e., the offsets integrate unconsciously.
TMS applied over the occipital cortex at different times after the presentation of the verniers selectively rendered the offset direction of either the first or the
second vernier more dominant, even when applied up to 400 ms after the presentation of the verniers. Hence, the integration of the vernier offsets is not
completed beforehand, and a conscious percept is only elicited a few hundred milliseconds after stimulus presentation. Vernier presentations are indicated
by the small depictions in the graph. Before TMS application, vernier offsets were adjusted such that performance was at 50%, i.e., on average observers
reported equally often the offset direction of the first and the second vernier (dashed line). A first vernier dominance of more than 50% indicates that the offset
direction of the first vernier was reported more often. Conversely, a first vernier dominance of less than 50% indicates dominance of the second vernier.
Adapted from [29].
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002433.g002
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one moment of time [20]. A high sampling rate is also incompatible with the feature fusion
experiment (Fig 2), in which conscious perception can be delayed for several hundred millisec-
onds [29].
How can these contradictory findings and ideas be reconciled? We propose a two-stage
model, in which first visual information is unconsciously processed with relatively high tempo-
ral resolution (Box 1). Second, conscious percepts occur at a much slower rate, at discrete
moments, “representing” the output of unconscious processing.
The Two-Stage Model
According to our model, the elements of a visual scene are first unconsciously analyzed. This
period can last up to 400 ms and involves, amongst other processes, the analysis of stimulus
features such as the orientation or color of elements and temporal features such as object
Box 1. Temporal Resolution of Sensory Systems
The temporal resolution of sensory systems depends on several factors. First, the physical
signal of a sensory stimulus needs to be converted into a brain signal. The visual system
relies on electrochemical transduction (i.e., light energy causes a change in the protein
rhodopsin in the retina), whereas in the auditory and somatosensory systems, sound
vibrations or touch are mechanically converted into electrical signals. Second, the signal
within the sensory system has to be processed such that changes between stimuli can be
detected. Three general types of temporal resolution can be distinguished: (a) the ability
to discriminate the repetition of a periodical signal, e.g., a flickering light or fluttering
sound (same system, same channel); (b) the ability to discriminate the onsets of two sig-
nals applied to two different channels within a sensory system, e.g., beeps to the left and
right ears or two flashes at different visual sites (same system, different channels); and (c)
the ability to discriminate the onsets of two signals applied to two different sensory sys-
tems (different systems, different channels).
(a) Our sensory systems differ remarkably in terms of the temporal scale along which
they can detect the difference between two stimuli. Whereas two clicks can already
be separated if they are only 1–3 ms apart [33], two taps need to be about 10 ms
apart [33], and two flashes about 25 ms [34]. However, for trains of stimuli, the pre-
sentation rate at which the sensation of flicker ceases is similar for the visual and
auditory systems, i.e., at around 16 ms inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) [35,36].
(b) Temporal order judgement within a sensory system is in the range of 20–50 ms ISI
and has been found not to differ substantially between the modalities [37–39]. How-
ever, under particular circumstances the auditory system yields faster discrimination
compared to the visual system [40].
(c) Comparing the order of events across different sensory systems has approximately
the same temporal resolution as within a sensory system [37]. This has been taken as
evidence for a supra-sensory timing mechanism that is involved in the detection of
onsets across all modalities [41]. However, the lack of transfer of learned temporal
order judgements between modalities questions the existence of a supra-sensory tim-
ing mechanism [40].
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duration and object simultaneity. Just like a color detector “labels” the stimulus shown in the
example in Fig 3 as “green,” and an orientation detector labels it as “oblique,” a duration detec-
tor assigns the label “50 ms.” Upon completion of the analysis, the features are integrated into a
coherent, conscious percept. All features become conscious simultaneously, and the percept
contains all the feature information derived from the various detectors. Hence, the green line
in Fig 3 is not actually consciously perceived as green during its actual presentation but later
when rendered conscious. The same holds true for temporal features. The stimulus is not per-
ceived during the 50 ms when it is presented. The stimulus is even not perceived for a duration
of 50 ms. Its duration is just encoded as a “number,” signifying that the duration was 50 ms in
the same way that the color is of a specific hue and saturation.
According to our model, the feature detectors are operating quasi-continuously and can
thus analyze features with a high temporal resolution compared to the conscious percepts,
which are generated at a much lower rate (Box 2). Visual information processing is similar to a
sample and hold mechanism in engineering as they are frequently used, for example, in analog/
digital converters. As a simple example, consider a digital watch. Invisible to the beholder, the
watch tracks the actual time with high temporal resolution by counting the oscillations of a
vibrating quartz. After a predetermined number of oscillations, the digital display changes
from, say, 23 hours and 7 minutes to 23 hours and 8 minutes. The display remains in this state
for the next minute, similarly to the conscious percept, which stays constant until the next per-
cept is elicited.
We would like to mention that, contrary to the watch example, we are not suggesting that
conscious percepts occur periodically and have identical durations. Instead, we propose that a
percept is elicited when unconscious processing reaches an attractor state [43,44]. The trajec-
tory towards the attractor state remains unconscious. Only attractor states code for the things
we perceive, whereas non-attractor states never reach consciousness. It will be important to
show how attractor and non-attractor states are coded on the neural level.
Fig 3. Two-stage model of visual perception. A stimulus, for example, a cross, is presented on a computer screen. Sensory information about the cross is
quasi-continuously and unconsciously analyzed by feature detectors. Just like color and orientation, temporal features are also coded as quantitative labels.
When unconscious feature integration is completed, all features are simultaneously rendered conscious at one discrete point in time, sometimes even
hundreds of milliseconds after the object was presented [29]. The conscious representation can be seen as a feature vector, which contains a value that
represents the stimulus best for each feature dimension, for example, a black cross with a 50 ms duration. Only the feature labels can be reported and
measured in experiments, but the actual percept during feature integration is not experimentally determinable. It might be that the previously generated
conscious percept stays constant until the next percept is elicited, or that the percept may be rendered conscious just for a moment of time and there is no
perception until the next percept emerges (as shown here).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002433.g003
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Our two-stage model is, first, not a standard snapshot model, in which pictures of the world
are taken at discrete times. According to our model, snapshots are of ongoing, quasi-continu-
ous, unconscious processing (see also [16]). Second, the snapshots are not randomly taken at
arbitrary times of unconscious processing. Instead, we propose that the snapshots represent
integrated, meaningful outputs of unconscious brain processing, namely, attractor states. The
snapshots are like a feature vector that contains a value for each relevant feature dimension of a
stimulus, which together, constitute a meaningful post-hoc representation of the event that
occurred during the unconscious processing period (Fig 3). Metaphorically, such a representa-
tion is akin to the answer to the question of how were your holidays: “We enjoyed the colors of
the Tuscan landscape for three days and then went to Venice for four sunny days at the sea.”
The response is a compressed post-hoc description regarding the temporal features of the trip
even though the actual event was spread over a long period of time.
Why do we not see sudden changes between the discrete percepts, as in a low temporal reso-
lution movie? As in any system, we cannot go beyond its resolution, i.e., we perceive time as
continuous just as we perceive a line as continuous even though its ink is of discrete atomic
nature.
Time-Consuming Unconscious Feature Integration
Why is such a long period of unconscious feature integration needed when our feature detec-
tors can operate much faster? Vision involves complex and ill-posed problems, which can only
be solved in a recurrent and time consuming manner [45,46]. This is particularly evident in the
case of motion. Take a football game as an example. Twenty-two players are constantly moving
around, all following their own trajectory. First, just to compute one motion trajectory, the
Box 2. Low Pass Filtering
A common argument against discrete theories is based on low pass filtering mechanisms,
for example, based on mathematical convolution. The basic idea is that sensory informa-
tion enters a buffer where it is integrated with preceding and following information. Like
the input, the output is also continuous [42]. For example, in the feature fusion experi-
ment, the sensory information of both verniers is integrated; therefore, conscious percep-
tion is delayed.
However, because such approaches assume that perception is continuous, humans
would perceive first the first vernier offset, then a mixture of the two, and then the second
vernier offset. In reality though, this is not the case. We perceive only one, static, fused
vernier, which does not change over time. Another problem is that integration in the fea-
ture fusion experiment lasts very long (i.e., 400 ms), whereas integration needs to be
much shorter in apparent motion paradigms, in which we can perceive differences of
only 3 ms. Low pass filtering mechanisms thus suffer from the same problem as basic
snapshot models.
Our model avoids these problems by decoupling sensory processing and perception,
as well as their respective time courses. However, also in our model, (unconscious) pro-
cessing occurs in a buffer and (conscious) perception is delayed. The difference to low
pass filtering is that, according to our model, the output of unconscious processing is dis-
crete, meaningful, and rendered conscious at once. Large parts of unconscious processing
will never reach consciousness.
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brain needs to integrate information across time and space. Hence instantaneous perception is
impossible. Second, the 2-D projections of the players on the retina often cross. In principle,
there are infinitely many possible 3-D world scenarios that can give rise to the very same 2-D
retinal projection. To compute the best out of a potentially infinite number of options in a
recursive manner, the brain needs time. For this reason, the brain functions such that we con-
sciously perceive only the most plausible solution, and not a confusing manifold of possibilities
that occur during unconscious processing. The unconscious feature integration period is the
period of sense-making.
As mentioned, percepts occur when processing has converged to an attractor state. The
duration of convergence depends on the complexity of the processing. Feature integration does
not always require lengthy computations. For example, fight-or-flight reflexes can be very fast,
and motor responses can occur before a conscious percept is fully developed. In these cases,
action is even faster than perception, i.e., actions can be elicited by unconscious processing
alone.
Discussion
We experience the world as a continuous stream of smoothly changing percepts. However,
past and recent psychophysical evidence suggest that perception is discrete. Nevertheless, sim-
ple snapshot theories quickly run into problems because they, for example, cannot explain the
relatively high temporal resolution of the visual system compared to slow conscious perception.
For this reason, we propose a two-stage model that decouples quasi-continuous unconscious
feature processing from conscious percepts, which occur only at discrete moments in time. The
conscious percept represents the output of unconscious processing, which has relatively high
temporal resolution. Unconscious processing evolves over time, whereas conscious perception
is discrete.
The most important implication of our model is that the duration of a conscious percept
and the temporal resolution of the visual system are independent issues. Thus, investigating
the former does not allow us to draw conclusions regarding the latter. As mentioned, experi-
ments have shown that humans perceive two disks as simultaneous when they are presented
within ~40 ms of one another [20]. This result was taken as evidence that perception lasts at
least 40 ms. However, the experiment tells us only that the temporal resolution of unconscious
processing is limited in this paradigm. No conclusions can be drawn about the duration of the
percepts. Likewise, reaction times in many experiments show periodic variations and were
often taken as evidence for discrete theories, in which information processing depends on
brain oscillations [16,47]. In a similar vein, the wagon wheel illusion seems to speak to such
brain oscillations [7]. We, to the contrary, argue that these experiments may reveal periodic
unconscious processes but cannot be linked to conscious perception. To investigate the mini-
mal duration of a conscious percept, we need to rely on indirect measures such as the feature
fusion paradigm combined with TMS [29]. This experiment revealed that feature fusion is not
completed before 400 ms, and consequently consciousness cannot occur beforehand. It thus
provides a lower bound for the minimal duration of percepts in this paradigm. However, this
experiment does not provide an upper bound and cannot directly measure the duration of per-
cepts. Other experimental methods with high temporal resolution, such as electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) (e.g., [48]) and especially electrophysiology (e.g., [49]), have provided valuable
insights into the temporal dynamics of unconscious processing by providing objective markers
of temporal processing. Complementarily, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
work has been successfully used to identify the spatial locations of neural structures involved in
the unconscious processing of time information (e.g., [50]).
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According to the two-stage model, we do not experience stimuli and objects during their
actual presentation, but much later, when they are rendered conscious. For example, a 50 ms
stimulus is not perceived for 50 ms during its presentation, but its perceived duration is the
result of unconscious processing that assigns a quantitative duration label to this stimulus [51–
54]. This is akin to how, for example, motion features are processed. We do not perceive
motion because we consciously track a dot point by point along its trajectory, but because the
output of motion detectors provides quantitative values for direction and speed. Hence, psy-
chophysical paradigms cannot reveal what we actually experience during feature integration
but can only reveal the consciously perceived output of processing, i.e., the feature labels (Fig
3). Furthermore, the coding of temporal features as quantitative labels can explain the long-
standing philosophical mystery regarding how we can experience nonstatic temporal features
even though our conscious experience is confined to the moment [9–13].
With our model, temporal illusions such as apparent motion, the color-phi phenomenon,
feature fusion, the flash lag effect, and many more can easily be explained. During the uncon-
scious processing period, the brain collects information to solve the ill-posed problems of
vision, for example, using Bayesian priors [55–59]. The percept is the best explanation in accor-
dance with the priors given the input. For example, in the color-phi phenomenon, object con-
stancy is more plausible than the abrupt temporal disk onsets and offsets, and thus the two
disks are interpreted as one moving disk whose color changes. Temporal aspects of a stimulus
are balanced with other priors, such as object constancy, proximity grouping, contextual expec-
tations, etc. For example, temporal reversals (i.e., when a first-presented stimulus is perceived
as being presented later in time) occur because the temporal order information is reduced so
much (by reducing the stimulus onset asynchrony and by varying the contrast), that it becomes
overruled by the saliency cue, which usually favors later stimuli (as demonstrated, for example,
by the recency effect in memory [60], and by backward masking being stronger than forward
masking [27,61]). Also contributing are other unconscious processes, such as spatially localized
changes in the temporal impulse response of early visual neurons. For example dark adaptation
decreases the firing threshold and thus might prolong the integration period, which can explain
why perceived duration can change as a function of the context in which the stimuli are pre-
sented [62–64]. In our model, perceptual illusions lose part of their mystery because perception
is, to a certain extent, decoupled from stimulus presentation and processing.
One important question is how the brain “knows” when unconscious processing is complete
and can be rendered conscious. We speculate that percepts occur when processing has con-
verged to an attractor state [43,44]. One possibility is that hitting an attractor state leads to a
signal that renders the content conscious, similarly to, for example, broadcasting in the global
workspace theory [65]. Another option is that attractor states are the conscious states. To shed
light on these speculations, future research needs to provide more insights into what distin-
guishes conscious from unconscious states. Related questions are the role of cognition, volition,
and attention in these processes. We speculate that these can strongly bias unconscious pro-
cessing towards specific attractor states. For example, when viewing ambiguous figures, a ver-
bal hint or shifting attention can bias observers to perceive either one of the possible
interpretations, each corresponding to a different attractor state [66].
We suggest that mechanisms similar to the ones related to the minimal time of a percept
also operate on longer time scales [67,68]. For example, full comprehension of a sentence
sometimes requires waiting until the last word. The sentences, "The mouse was broken," and
"The mouse was dead," differ radically in meaning, but this difference is determined only by
the last word [31]. Real-time understanding would have to be fragmented since the last word
needs to be integrated with the word "mouse," which can take substantial time depending on
the speed of reading or speaking.
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As mentioned, stimuli presented within ~40 ms are often perceived as occurring simulta-
neously [20]. In schizophrenic patients, the integration window is much longer [69]. Interest-
ingly, schizophrenic patients often report that the stream of perception is strongly fragmented.
In this respect, patient studies may offer important insights into the structure of temporal
processing.
Our considerations go well beyond perception research. They are also crucial for neurosci-
ence and computer vision, which both have to provide answers to the question of what aspects
of processing are rendered “conscious,” and at what time. Our model also advances neural cod-
ing theory because it allows distinctions to be made between neural states corresponding to the
unsconsious processing and stable attractor states that represent the meaningful percept. As
importantly, our model challenges prominent theories on philosophy of mind, which assume
that consciousness is a continuous stream.
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